When a Beneficiary Never Existed: A Queensland Will, a Romance Scam and a 300-Year-Old Legal Principle
Most disputes involving Wills concern disagreements about who should inherit an estate. But what happens when the person named as a beneficiary never actually existed?
That was the rather extraordinary question confronting the Supreme Court of Queensland in In the Will of Clifford Stanley Perrin [2026] QSC 247, a recent decision involving an elderly gentleman, an elaborate online romance scam and a homemade Will.
The case is certainly unusual, but behind the remarkable facts are some important lessons about testamentary intentions, financial exploitation and the importance of careful estate planning.
A romance that wasn’t quite what it seemed
Clifford Stanley Perrin was an 84-year-old pensioner living alone in Hervey Bay when he died on Christmas Eve in 2025.
In approximately 2012, Mr Perrin began an online relationship with a woman who called herself Stella Helena Bennett. Stella claimed to be a former New York fashion model who had inherited substantial wealth.
Despite never meeting in person, Mr Perrin believed the couple had married by proxy in New York in April 2013.
Unfortunately, Stella was not who she claimed to be.
Over the following decade, Mr Perrin was persuaded to send money, cryptocurrency, gift cards and personal identification documents to Stella, supposedly to assist her in accessing an inheritance.
He was also repeatedly encouraged to take out a reverse mortgage over his home.
By the time of his death, Mr Perrin’s finances had been substantially depleted, with his principal remaining asset being a modest property in Hervey Bay, itself subject to a reverse mortgage.
Perhaps one of the saddest aspects of the case is that Mr Perrin had, at various times, expressed suspicions about Stella’s identity and conduct. Indeed, in 2024, his bank blocked a transfer after identifying the recipient account as being associated with a scam.
Nevertheless, the relationship continued.
The problem with the Will
In May 2024, Mr Perrin prepared a homemade Will, witnessed by two Justices of the Peace.
He appointed Stella, whom he described as his wife, as executor and left the bulk of his estate to her.
However, he also made provision for his daughter, Tanya Stankovich.
The Will appointed Tanya as substitute executor if Stella was unable to act because of illness, injury or death.
It also contained the following gift-over provision:
“If Stella Helena PERRIN should pass away before my death, then the contents herein of my entire estate will go to my DAUGHTER…”
Following Mr Perrin’s death, his daughter sought orders from the Supreme Court concerning the validity and construction of the Will.
The evidence established that the person Mr Perrin believed to be Stella was fictitious.
The purported marriage certificate was fraudulent, no marriage had been registered in New York, and Stella had refused to provide proof of her identity when contacted following Mr Perrin’s death.
The Court concluded that Stella, as Mr Perrin understood her to be, did not exist.
Her appointment as executor and the gift in her favour therefore failed.
But that presented another problem.
Mr Perrin’s Will only provided for his daughter to inherit if Stella died before him.
How could someone who never existed have died before the testator?
And if the condition specified in the Will could never occur, could the daughter nevertheless inherit?
A 300-year-old legal principle provides the answer
This is where the decision becomes particularly interesting for succession law practitioners.
Justice Treston considered the longstanding rule in Jones v Westcomb (1711), a principle concerning the construction of testamentary gift-over provisions.
Broadly speaking, the rule permits a gift-over provision to operate in circumstances not expressly contemplated by the testator, where it is clear that the testator must have intended the gift to take effect in those circumstances.
Importantly, the rule does not allow a court to simply rewrite a Will to achieve what it considers a fair outcome.
Rather, the Court must be satisfied, having regard to the language of the Will and the admissible surrounding circumstances, that the testator’s intention necessarily extended to the situation that has actually arisen.
In Mr Perrin’s case, several factors were particularly relevant.
Although he did not enjoy a close relationship with his daughter, he had deliberately nominated her as the substitute executor and beneficiary of his entire estate.
He had therefore turned his mind to what should happen if Stella was no longer able to act or receive his estate.
There was also evidence that Mr Perrin had harboured concerns about Stella’s identity and possible fraudulent conduct during their supposed relationship.
Having considered those circumstances, Justice Treston concluded that it was an ineluctable inference — essentially, an unavoidable conclusion — that Mr Perrin would have intended his daughter to inherit if he had known Stella did not exist.
The Court therefore determined that the gift-over provision operated in favour of his daughter.
Interestingly, Justice Treston also considered an alternative legal principle arising from Kennell v Abbott (1799), concerning testamentary gifts made because of fraudulent assumptions about a beneficiary’s identity or character.
His Honour indicated that, had the rule in Jones v Westcomb not applied, he would have been prepared to sever the provisions of the Will affected by Mr Perrin’s mistaken belief about Stella.
Ultimately, the Court pronounced the Will valid in solemn form and declared Tanya entitled to probate as executor and to the residue of her father’s estate as sole beneficiary.
What can we learn from this case?
There are several aspects of this decision that I find particularly interesting, both as an estate planning solicitor and from the perspective of protecting vulnerable members of our community.
First, being the victim of financial exploitation does not necessarily mean a person lacks testamentary capacity.
Despite the extensive evidence of Mr Perrin’s involvement in a romance scam, the Court found no evidence that he lacked testamentary capacity when he made his Will.
This is an important distinction.
People are entitled to make their own decisions about their relationships, finances and testamentary wishes, even when others might question the wisdom of those decisions.
Our role as solicitors is not to substitute our own judgment for that of our clients.
However, we do need to be alert to circumstances suggesting that a client’s instructions may be influenced by fraud, manipulation or undue influence.
There is often a delicate balance between respecting a person’s autonomy and ensuring that their testamentary wishes are genuinely their own.
Second, the wording of a Will matters. Sometimes enormously.
Mr Perrin had the foresight to include a substitute beneficiary, but the provision only expressly contemplated Stella dying before him.
It did not contemplate the possibility that she had never existed.
Fortunately for his daughter, the Court was prepared to apply established principles of testamentary construction to give effect to what it determined were Mr Perrin’s intentions.
But that outcome was not automatic.
The decision turned on the particular wording of the Will and the evidence before the Court.
It is a useful reminder that carefully considered contingency provisions can make a significant difference when circumstances do not unfold as expected.
The distinction between a beneficiary who has died, cannot be located, cannot be identified or never existed may seem remote when preparing a Will. As this case demonstrates, those distinctions can have very real consequences.
Third, good estate planning requires more than simply recording who receives what.
One of the most important parts of preparing a Will is understanding the relationships, circumstances and assumptions behind a client’s instructions.
That does not mean questioning every unusual relationship or treating older clients as incapable of making independent decisions.
Far from it.
It means taking the time to listen, asking appropriate questions and recognising when circumstances might warrant further enquiries.
It also means having conversations about what should happen if the client’s circumstances change or their first choice of executor or beneficiary cannot fulfil that role.
Those conversations are not always straightforward, but they are an important part of getting estate planning right.
A final thought
There is something particularly poignant about this case.
Mr Perrin spent more than a decade believing he was in a relationship with someone who, as the Court ultimately determined, did not exist as represented.
The financial consequences were substantial, and following his death, his daughter was required to seek the assistance of the Supreme Court to establish her entitlement under his Will.
Although the Court was ultimately able to give effect to Mr Perrin’s testamentary intentions, the proceedings came at a cost, with the Court ordering that the legal costs be paid from his estate.
It is easy to become absorbed in the unusual legal questions raised by this decision. And there are certainly some fascinating ones.
But we should not lose sight of the person at the centre of it.
For me, the case reinforces something I consider fundamental to good estate planning.
A Will is not simply a document setting out who gets what when we die. It is the product of our relationships, circumstances and the decisions we make about the people who matter to us.
Taking the time to understand those matters, and ensuring the Will properly reflects them, is just as important as getting the legal drafting right.
And hopefully, with careful planning, fewer families will find themselves needing a Supreme Court judgment — and a legal principle dating back more than 300 years — to work out what their loved one intended.
Lisa Hughes is an estate planning solicitor and Principal of Virago Law. She holds a Master of Laws (Applied Law), majoring in Wills and Estates.
Case discussed: In the Will of Clifford Stanley Perrin [2026] QSC 247 (Supreme Court of Queensland, Treston J, 24 September 2026).
This article provides general information and commentary and is not intended to constitute legal advice.